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Abstract
Background: Large-scale genetic data sets are frequently shared with other research groups and even released on
the Internet to allow for secondary analysis. Study participants are usually not informed about such data sharing
because data sets are assumed to be anonymous after stripping off personal identifiers.
Discussion: The assumption of anonymity of genetic data sets, however, is tenuous because genetic data are
intrinsically self-identifying. Two types of re-identification are possible: the “Netflix” type and the “profiling” type.
The “Netflix” type needs another small genetic data set, usually with less than 100 SNPs but including a personal
identifier. This second data set might originate from another clinical examination, a study of leftover samples or
forensic testing. When merged to the primary, unidentified set it will re-identify all samples of that individual.
Even with no second data set at hand, a “profiling” strategy can be developed to extract as much information as
possible from a sample collection. Starting with the identification of ethnic subgroups along with predictions of
body characteristics and diseases, the asthma kids case as a real-life example is used to illustrate that approach.
Summary: Depending on the degree of supplemental information, there is a good chance that at least a few
individuals can be identified from an anonymized data set. Any re-identification, however, may potentially harm
study participants because it will release individual genetic disease risks to the public.
Background
Large-scale SNP data sets are shared with other research
groups or even released on the Internet to foster new
collaborations or to allow for second-look analysis [1],
[2]. Study participants are not always informed about
such data sharing because these kinds of data are
assumed to be anonymous after stripping off personal
identifiers like name or date of birth (a process also
called pseudonymization).
Discussion
This procedure, however, touches several aspects identi-
fied in the earlier literature such as confidentiality and
genetic privacy [3], [4], [5].
Confidentiality has been seen in the past as a funda-
mental ethical principle in health care and breaching
confidentiality is usually a reason for disciplinary action.
It has been assigned such a great value because it
directly originates from the patient’s autonomy to con-
trol his or her own life. Releasing sensitive information
in a professional patient-physician relationship is
regarded by most patients as an implicit contract that
doctors will keep all information confidential.
Such a contract is also inferred in genetic epidemiol-
ogy [6,7]. The European Court of Human Rights there-
fore ruled in 2008 that the world’sl a r g e s tD N A
database, based in the UK, violated Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights which protects
privacy [8]. An earlier survey conducted by the Genetics
and Public Policy Center found that the majority of the
Americans surveyed supported genetic testing for
research and health care, but 92% also felt concern that
genetic test results revealing risk of future disease might
be used in ways that would be harmful to a person [9].
Genetic privacy is therefore well founded in theory and
appreciated in practice.
Anonymity
Anonymity is derived from the Greek word aνωνυμίa,
meaning “no name”, however it soon took on the meaning
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anonymity may be seen as a variable level of hiding an
identity that largely depends on surrounding information
(statistically seen as a proposition of a true or false identity
assignment with a Bayesian probability P for the proposi-
tion to be true or false). A set of banknotes in a pocket
may be largely uninformative, as long as they do not con-
tain a certain mix of issuing offices that will allow recon-
struction of the travel history of the owner.
The assumption of anonymity of genetic data sets is
tenuous if personal identifiers are merely removed and
kept in another place [8]. Moreover, the usual k-anon-
ymization strategy, where each relevant entity is hidden
in at least k peers, is not feasible with such highly infor-
mative data sets [2]. Some authors even believe that de-
identifying records is just a matter of economic invest-
ment ranging between $ 0 and $ 17,000 even for data
protected under the “safe harbor” act, the U.S. Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act [10].
Genetic data are intrinsically self-identifying [11],
hence their use in forensic investigations. With the pro-
gress of genome-wide association studies, earlier work
on genetic privacy has become outdated [3], [12], [13]
and will finally be buried with the advent of whole gen-
ome sequencing [14]. Although current study leaflets
still promise “strict confidentiality” to study participants,
some authors conclude that anonymity is already a
thing of the past [15]. Family history and genetic diag-
noses are already being traced on the Internet [7] using
dedicated websites [16].
Attackers
Are there any real threats to anonymity? The answer
may depend on the overall interest in re-identification
of data driven by financial interests, (pseudo-) ethical
reasons, personal interests or just curiosity. Benitez and
Malin [10] describe three types of data intruders, nota-
bly prosecutor, journalist, and marketer types. The pro-
secutor attack has a specific target; the journalist attack
is interested in identifying a particular record, while the
adversary’s goal in the marketer attack is to identify as
many records as possible.
Heeney et al. [7] further examined the motivation of
data intruders that range from scientists doing further
research, police and secret services for forensic pur-
poses, but also agents working in marketing, insurance
or employment offices. In addition there is a large com-
munity interested in genealogy some with even “strong
[...] motivations, including adoptees and donor-
conceived children”, who claim to have rights to
de-identify genetic information.
There are already examples in the literature where a
single individual could be identified [17]; surnames of
individuals in the Hapmap samples could be traced [18]
or James Watson’s ApoE gene status inferred although
not being released [19].
Attack Types
At least two types of de-anonymization attacks can be
differentiated. The first attack scenario comprises
another rather small genetic data set of less than 100
SNPs but including personal identifiers (3). This second
data set might originate from a later clinical examina-
tion, another study of leftover samples, or some forensic
testing. This data set might then be merged to the large
unidentified set by using identical markers in both sets.
Although such a scenario is rather trivial from a techni-
cal point of view, it puts considerable pressure on tested
individuals to avoid any retesting of their DNA (and of
all close relatives). This type of attack may be called the
“Netflix” type, named after the famous historical
approach of two programmers who linked the anon-
ymized Netflix video rental database with the true name
Internet Movie Rating Database. They used a new class
of statistical de-anonymization attack against a high-
dimensional data set that included individual prefer-
ences, recommendations and transaction records [20].
The second type of a de-anonymization attack is a
“profiling” approach that combines various levels of evi-
dence. Although described earlier (for example as trail
re-identification) this approach became only possible
very recently. It employs different levels where informa-
tion is being gathered and may be illustrated by a practi-
cal example using the “asthma kids” data set [21].
Box
Genetic profiling using genome-wide SNP panels: A
practical example.
(1) Background. The history of the sample collection
is the most informative piece of information. A sample
collection with origin “Munich” [21] already reduces a
probability of an individual to be present in a data set
from approximately 1:6,839 billion to 1:1,314 million.
With the addition of the criteria “child” and “asthma”,
the probability is further reduced to 1:32.850. As study
participation is not equal among social classes (with a
bias of inner city participants and a bias of more severe
cases attending a University department) the target
group may be narrowed down to less than 1:2.000 and
with known sex to less than 1:1.000.
(2) Subsets. Data subgroups and extreme dimensions
of SNP array data may be checked by multidimensional
scaling techniques. In the example above there is strati-
fication in the data deposited online which is most likely
explained by the inclusion of a minority group in the
sample. Since public population databases include allele
counts of hundreds of populations, this information can
be used to further locate immigrant children to a region
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but inbreeding, the inbreeding coefficient could also
allow a guess about which population was included.
Average linkage disequilibrium values may further tell if
the population is more rural or more metropolitan. Pair-
wise identity by state distances between individuals
allow to uncover also related individuals. Indeed, there
are unreported siblings in the examined data set. Taking
all this information together, this represents several
unique cases that nurses and physicians at the Children’
Hospital Munich may immediately recognize along with
pharmacists, health insurance employees, school tea-
chers or football coaches in inner city Munich.
(3) Phenotype prediction. A DNA-based prediction of
individual phenotype characteristics is still in its infancy.
So far, only the sex of a participant can be unequivocally
determined using for example the AmelX/AmelY marker
system; height prediction may be possible by using mar-
kers in hedgehog signalling or extracellular matrix genes;
body mass can predicted by MC4R gene variants.
Furthermore, we can guess skin and hair colour by
OCA2 gene variants, while there might even be a small
chance for an age prediction as aging introduces de novo
mutations. Unique characteristics like refractive errors
(MYP2), digital clubbing (HPGD), cryptorchidism
(NR5A1), ear wax (ABCC11), bitter taste reception
(TAS2R), freckling (BNC2), male baldness (AR, PAX1) or
hair morphology (TCHH) is predictable together with
behavioural traits like aggression (MAO-A) or anxiety
type disorders (RGS2). There is a gene (AVPR1A)
thought to influence divorce rate while alcohol depen-
dency (GHS-R1A, NPY2R) and addictive smoking may
be detectable as well (APBB1, CHRNA3). One gene
became famous as the “god gene” (VMAT2) for being
connected to religiosity, and another gene was assumed
to influence intelligence (IQSEC2). Clearly, most of these
predictions come with rather low predictive values, but it
may be well be possible in the near future to run an
SNP-derived prediction against a leaked Facebook profile.
(4) Disease prediction. Another source of information
comes by scanning known disease variants. If present in
a data set these variants are highly associated with the
development of rare monogenic disease. Each of the
~2,400 OMIM phenotypes with known molecular back-
ground may be revealing when present in an individual
DNA sample. In addition copy number variants as well
as haplotypes may also be used for de-anonymization
because these represent unique characteristic even in
close relatives.
(5) Clinical status. Genotyping is usually done on a
pool of blood cells while the composition of the pool
m a yb ea f f e c t e db ys e v e r a ld i seases. For example cells
undergoing somatic recombination may be detected in
the pool if they are particularly high (leukaemia) or low
(AIDS). There might be even a chance of finding foreign
cells (microchimerism indicative of pregnancy or recent
abortion) as even 1 in 1000 cells can be detected by
genome-wide SNP arrays.
Depending on the data structure and the degree of sup-
plemental information, there is a good chance that at
least some individuals can be immediately de-identified
by a profiling approach.
Risks and defense
Any re-identification will expose individual genetic risks in
the public as individuals become vulnerable to the conse-
quences of genetic testing ranging from un-insurability,
un-employability or other discrimination. It is difficult to
anticipate any further use of genetic data while it is
expected that threats to privacy and confidentiality will
increase as genomic technologies are rolled out more
widely.
Several options have been proposed on how to deal
with genetic privacy in the future. These include open
consent, better encoding techniques, or implementing
legal constraints along with restricted data access.
Although open consent (no “promises of anonymity,
privacy or confidentiality are made”) acknowledges the
fact that there are no anonymous genetic data, while
agreeing to this may be only an option for individuals
with “a master’s degree in genetics” [2]. For genetic epi-
demiology studies, however, that rely on high response
ratios, open consent is not a realistic option.
Better encoding could be another option. Making mal-
icious data de-identification is, however, difficult to con-
trol on a worldwide scale while most countries still lack
data protection laws. Also, more sophisticated encoding
techniques are unlikely to prevent data misuse because
they will just compete with better de-identification
strategies.
The most feasible solution therefore will be highly
restricted data access. Simply put - data not available
cannot be decrypted. This policy seems to be adopted
now by large research organizations like the NIH and
the Wellcome Trust, who have already removed genetic
data from their websites [6].
Summary
Most importantly, it seems necessary to increase public
awareness of genetic privacy and to inform probands
continuously about the use of their samples and data
[1]. The risks of re-identification of anonymized data
should be included in informed consent procedures, and
any data sharing needs to be explicitly approved by the
DNA donor. As a measure of precaution, genetic data
should not be distributed on public Internet sites, and
data sets with more than 100 SNP markers should be
removed from public web servers if not explicitly
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access should be restricted to scientific collaborations
under confidentiality agreements only.
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